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This paper investigates growth differences in the urban system of the EU12 between the 
means of 1978/80 and 1992/94. Models in which growth of real GDP p.c. is the dependent 
variable perform well and make it possible to test significant hypotheses. The analysis 
supports the conclusion that systems of urban governance are strongly related to growth. The 
variables are formulated in a way which tests hypotheses derived from ‘fiscal federalism’ 
viewing growth promotion as the production of a local public good. Evidence is also found 
supporting a spatial adaptation of the endogenous growth model with the relative size of the 
university sector having a highly significant role in explaining growth differences. Careful 
testing for spatial dependence reveals that national borders are significant barriers to 
adjustment but including explicit spatial effects resolves the specification problems. Density 
of urbanisation in some parts of the EU12 produces a local ‘growth shadow’ effect consistent 
with dynamic agglomeration economies and with commuting flows having an important role 
in spatial economic adjustment processes where cities are densely packed. In addition, 
evidence is found supporting the conclusion that integration shocks in the EU favour core 
areas but that this effect tends to fade with time. 
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1. Introduction
1 
In another paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2004) we have shown that it is appropriate to analyse 
differential rates of growth of real GDP per capita if one is interested in investigating 
differences in welfare changes across Europe’s cities. Despite a compensating variations 
approach showing that people adjusted to differences in quality of life between cities within 
countries, the evidence strongly supported the conclusion that no such pattern existed across 
the cities of Europe as a whole. In that sense city regions within the EU seem to behave like 
city-states, not as simply the spatial units from which a continental economy is constructed. 
The central assumption of perfectly mobile factors and the equalisation of real marginal 
returns across cities explicit in models of compensating variations (the Quality of Life 
approach developed on the basis of Roback’s 1982 contribution) cannot reasonably be 
maintained in the European context.  
 
This paper therefore returns to the analysis of differential rates of growth of real income 
across city regions (represented as Functional Urban Regions or FURs – used in Cheshire and 
Magrini 2000 and 2004). We focus on the role of three types of variable identified in 
economic theory as potentially important in explaining economic growth in a spatial context. 
The first is the systematic spatial effects of European integration. Interest in this empirically 
goes back at least to Clark et al (1969) and it is interesting to use the quantitative indicators 
actually derived by Clark and his associates before the impact of European integration was 
significantly felt. Interest in these factors has been given a significant boost as a result of the 
theoretical developments of New Economic Geography as summarised, for example, in Fujita 
et al., 1999. The second variable we are interested in is the role of R & D and human capital. 
Here we are interested in testing a spatialised adaptation of endogenous growth theory (see 
Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996 or, for a more rigorous development, Magrini, 1998). The third 
area we are interested in investigating is the relationship between systems of city government 
and city growth performance. Here we test one of the basic propositions of fiscal federalism: 
that 'the existence and magnitude of spillover effects clearly depends on the geographical 
extent of the relevant jurisdiction' (Oates, 1999). Specifically we test that there is a positive 
relationship between the degree of co-incidence of governmental boundaries with those of 
functionally defined city-regions and the growth performance of the city-region.  
 
We have also paid particular attention to issues of spatial dependency. Spatial econometrics 
tends to exist as a separate area of interest in which a finding of spatial dependency is often an 
end in itself  - sometimes to be ‘corrected’ by introducing spatial lags. Our views are 
somewhat different. It seems important to test for spatial dependency since, if it is present, 
and the analysis does not properly take it into account, parameter estimates can be biased just 
as they can be in time series analysis if there are problems of serial autocorrelation which are 
not offset for. However, it seems to us that the discovery of spatial dependence should trigger 
a further but economically inspired investigation. If, for example, a problem of spatial 
autocorrelation in the residuals is indicated this suggests there is a specification problem. 
Something which explains this pattern has been omitted and if the model is specified better 
then the problem should be resolved. This is particularly relevant in investigating spatial 
economic processes since theory suggests that there are important spatial adjustment 
mechanisms and other spatially determined features of economies. For example, labour 
markets and housing markets are likely to adjust to price and real wage differences in ways 
                                                 
1 The  authors have benefited from many discussions with colleagues as this work has developed. The authors 
retain responsibility for any remaining deficiencies or errors. This paper draws on work undertaken for a project 
within the ESRC’s Cities Initiative under Award  L 130251015 whose support is gratefully acknowledged. 
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conditioned on some measure of distance. Theoretical and empirical investigations of 
agglomeration economies, human capital and innovation suggest there are important spatial 
aspects of these features of economies. These are possible sources of spatial interaction 
between cities’ economies which, if not represented in the model, would plausibly show up as 
spatial dependency.  
 
As the results reported below suggest, there seems to be some validity to this viewpoint. 
When we estimate growth models in which no spatial adjustment processes are explicitly 
included, tests show that there are problems of spatial dependency which cannot be eliminated 
simply be estimating a spatially lagged model. However deliberately including measures of 
spatial economic adjustment processes, which are a function of the distance between cities, 
does appear to eliminate spatial dependence and specification problems.  
 
In addition, the way in which the sensitivity of the models to measures of spatial dependence 
varies with the particular distance weights used provides, in our interpretation, insight into 
economic processes. Problems of spatial dependence only reveal themselves if an additional 
distance penalty to adjustment is included for national borders: this, we judge, tells one about 
the extent to which urban systems in Western Europe still adjust as a set of national urban 
systems rather than as a unified EU urban system. 
 
We should clarify from the outset that we do not conceive of growth promotion policies in the 
narrow sense in which their advocates often speak of them: as policies aimed at the direct 
attraction of mobile investment. We have a much broader definition in mind. Such policies 
include: having a concern for efficient public administration so that uncertainty is reduced; 
making sure relevant infrastructure is provided and maintained; co-ordination between public 
and private investment; providing training which is relevant and effective; and ensuring that 
land use policies are flexible and co-ordinated with infrastructure provision and the demands 
of private sector investors. It could also involve giving a higher priority to output growth as 
opposed to equity or environmental outcomes. It need not involve spending more, even on 
infrastructure, so a simple measure of local expenditure is unlikely to be an appropriate 
measure of the efficacy of growth promotion efforts even were such a variable available. 
Grand projects such, perhaps, as the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao, London’s Millennium 
Dome or a trophy metro system in Toulouse – may be expensive but not productive; efficient 
public administration and reduction of uncertainty for private investment by rapid decision-
making, clearly defined land use policies and infrastructure planning, may cost less than their 
inefficient alternatives. 
 
Since the output of such policies is the impact they have on local growth performance they 
can be viewed as the provision of a pure local public good
2. It will be hard to impossible to 
exclude agents who have not contributed to the policy from any benefits the policy generates; 
and there will be a zero opportunity cost in consumption: if your rents rise so do mine and the 
increase in yours is not a cost to me; if your employment opportunities improve that, too, is 
not a cost to mine. The closer the coincidence in the boundaries of the governmental unit 
providing such policies with those of the economic region within which their impact is 
contained, the less will be the spatial spillovers to non-contributors. In addition, the larger is 
the central unit of government of an economically self-contained urban region relative to the 
size of that region as a whole, the lower will be the transactions costs in building a 'growth-
coalition' or territorially competitive club.  
                                                 
2 The local public good, non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, is, of course the growth they may 
produce. Resources employed in the promotion of growth are simply a cost. 
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Our analysis of the data presented in section 3 below, suggests there is evidence of a strong 
relationship between the degree of coincidence of governmental and economic boundaries in 
EU cities and the city’s growth performance. Our evidence is consistent with both the basic 
premises of fiscal federalism, therefore, and the conditionality of the provision of local public 
goods. It is, furthermore, consistent with there being some systematic contribution that local 
public administration can make to local growth performance. 
 
2.  Data and variables 
All the analysis is performed on a data set built up over a 25 year period relating to Functional 
Urban Regions (FURs) defined
3 so far as possible according to common criteria across the 
EU of 12. Such FURs correspond to the economic spheres of influence of significant 
employment concentrations and are relatively self-contained in economic terms. The analysis 
is conducted only for FURs with a population of more than one third of a million and a core 
city which exceeded 200 000 at some date between 1951 and 1981. Cities of the former 
eastern Länder of Germany and Berlin have to be excluded because of lack of data. The new 
basis on which Eurostat estimated regional GDP from 1995 onwards means that the analysis 
stops then. The variables used are defined in Appendix 1 which also provides a brief 
description of how they were measured and the sources used.  All data are defined to common 
statistical concepts either weighting data available from the Eurostat REGIO database to 
estimate values for FURs or collected directly from national statistical offices or common data 
providers and adjusted where necessary to common definitions. There is necessarily some 
imperfection and imprecision in such data but they have the merit of not only allowing 
analysis of specifically European cities but also of allowing the investigation of questions 
which, because of lack of variation, simply could not be investigated in the context of the US 
urban system.  
 
Since the focus of this paper is regional fixed effects, the analysis employs OLS but we 
provide substantial testing to ensure the results are not subject to econometric problems. Since 
the observations represent the population of West European city-regions the other objections 
raised by Levine and Renelt (1992) or Levine and Zervos (1993) to the use of cross sectional 
OLS in cross country growth studies do not seem to apply.   
 
We have still not managed to find a satisfactory way of bridging the Eurostat regional GDP 
series across the difference in estimation methodology introduced in 1995. Thus, we are still 
analysing the rate of growth of GDP at common PPS values estimated for each FUR based on 
Eurostat GDP for Level 3 regions. Estimates of GDP p.c. for FURs are derived by using the 
distribution of FUR population between Level 3 regions at the closest Census dates as weights 
and then applying those weights to the relevant Level 3 GDP p.c. data
4. Because of 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of the definition of the FURs used throughout this paper see Cheshire and Hay (1989). 
They are defined on the basis of core cities identified by concentrations of employment and hinterlands from which 
more commuters flow to the employment core than to any other subject to a minimum cut off. They were defined on 
the basis of data for 1971. They are broadly similar in concept to the (Standard) Metropolitan Statistical Areas used 
in the US. As has been argued elsewhere (Cheshire and Hay, 1989) the great variability in the relationship between 
administrative boundaries and the economic reality of European cities and regions introduces serious error and a 
strong likelihood of bias into data reported for administratively defined cities. The FUR/city and region of Bremen 
provide an extreme but not wholly unrepresentative example. Because of population relative to employment 
decentralisation over the relevant period the growth of GDP p.c. is overstated by some 40% if the published Eurostat 
data for the administrative region is relied on. 
4 The EU institutions deal in so-called Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (N.U.T.S.) regions. 
This is a nesting set of regions based on national territorial divisions. The largest are Level 1 regions; the 
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measurement error and short run fluctuations in Eurostat data, we take the start point of the 
series as the mean for 1978-80 and the end point as the mean for 1992 to 1994. We are thus 
analysing a period too short to correspond to a conceptual long run. Even if the system did 
tend to equalisation of returns to factors on the margin new shocks and disturbances will 
occur long before such a position is reached. We need therefore to model a system in which 
real incomes can permanently (in the sense of any period we can observe) vary between cities.  
 
The data used are derived mainly from Eurostat, accessed via REGIO. Regional GDP data have 
been published for most Level 1, 2 and 3 regions since 1978 although for some it is available 
from 1977. There are however gaps – data for Greek and Portuguese regions for example only 
became available later. In both cases, REGIO data have been supplemented with national data. 
For some countries, such as Italy, data for earlier years were only published for Level 2 regions. 
National sources, for example of value added in Italy, have been used to disaggregate from Level 
2 to Level 3 values where none are published by Eurostat.  Other data come from a number of 
sources including Eurostat (for example the employment by sector and the unemployment data) 
as well as other sources. All the variables used are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
The same control variables are used for industrial structure as have been used in previous work 
(see Cheshire and Magrini, 2000 for an explanation and justification). As before the more 
detailed measures relating to old resource-based industries work better than broader measures of 
specialisation in industry or initial unemployment rates. A measure of the rate of growth of GDP 
p.c. in the area of each country outside the major FURs is included as a control for national 
institutional, policy and other factors which may have led to countries having had country-
specific differences in their growth rates over the period. The variable should also effectively 
control for national differences in the incidence of the economic cycle. Although national 
dummies have been the way in which this problem has frequently been handled in the literature it 
seems more elegant and powerful to use the continuous variable employed here. Besides being 
highly significant a further point of interest is that it eliminates the significance of any measure 
of the initial level of GDP p.c. Previous work has shown that both the significance and even sign 
of this commonly used variable were highly dependent on model specification (Cheshire and 
Carbonaro, 1996) and this confirms that result. It suggests that there is more variance in FUR 
growth rates across countries than within them and that the initial level of GDP p.c. acts in large 
measure as a national dummy. This finding is one factor underlying our scepticism with respect 
to the many estimates of so-called β-convergence following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991; 1992; 1995). All the results of models which included the initial level of per capita 
income were unsatisfactory, with highly unstable co-efficient estimates associated with the 
variable and problems of collinearity.  
 
The log of population size is included with the expectation that larger cities will have grown 
faster in terms of GDP p.c. because of productivity gains in larger urban areas (see Costa and 
Kahn, 2000 for a convincing account of at least one important source of such productivity gains 
in larger cities). Dynamic agglomeration economies are another possible explanation. Initial 
population density is also included since, other things equal, cities with higher density will have 
higher rents and greater congestion. A negative relationship is expected. In our judgement, initial 
population density is likely mainly to reflect differences between FURs in the constraint on 
urban land supply produced by land use regulation policies. Higher density other things equal 
signals a tighter constraint imposed on development. Topography and the inertia of inheritance 
embodied in the built environment no doubt contribute to differences in densities but probably 
                                                                                                                                                          
smallest for which a reasonable range of data is available are Level 3. These correspond to Counties in the UK, 
Départements in France; Provincies in Italy or Kreise in Germany. 
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less than land use policy which varies substantially both across countries and between cities in 
Europe. 
 
Given that our observational units represent sub-national economic regions as self-contained as 
are likely to exist, what basis is there for hypothesising that their form of government – 
specifically the degree of co-incidence of the spatial boundaries of government to those of the 
FUR – are likely to be directly related to observed differences in growth rates? It is reasonable to 
think of any FUR as being made up of one or more administrative units and that a 'club' of 
administrative units (whether including private sector actors or not) will have to be formed to 
provide growth promotion policies. It is also reasonable to assume that the largest unit within the 
FUR – the central unit – will always be a part of such a club, either alone or together with other 
administrative units, so the territory of a FUR is made up of two potential sets of governmental 
units: the policy club members and the group of non-participating units.  
 
With EU integration over the past 20 years there has been an associated development of 
territorial competition or competition between regions to promote local growth. To the extent 
that there is an ‘output’ from such activities, it is local economic growth which as was argued 
above is the provision of a pure local public good. There are, therefore, the usual problems 
associated with the provision of (local) public goods, including a classic problem of spatial 
spillovers. Whether or not such policies are engaged in will be conditioned primarily on the 
structure of the incentives faced by the economic actors who may attempt to form a 
public/private consortium or ‘growth promotion club’.  
 
The expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth that a given club 
expects it can generate. Since FURs are defined to be economically self-contained, it is 
reasonable to assume that the territory their boundaries identify contains any the benefits that 
might be generated by local growth promotion policies. For a given potential growth gain for a 
FUR - which contains the benefits of the growth - the expected payoff for any growth club will 
fall as the size of the territory falls in relation to that of the FUR within the boundaries of which 
the ‘club’ is located. This is because the spillover losses to areas of the FUR not represented in 
the club increases. Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected net payoff would 
fall as the transactions costs necessarily incurred to form the club increase. Transactions costs 
will be positively related to the number of relevant potential members and the institutional 
dominance of the lead actor (which we can assume will be a governmental unit). Thus expected 
net benefits will increase and costs fall as the size of the largest (normally that representing the 
central unit or urban core) governmental unit increases relative to the size of the FUR. 
Arguments such as these led Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth 
promotion policies would be more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where 
'there are a smaller number of public agencies representing the functional economic region, with 
the boundaries of the highest tier authority approximating to those of the region…'. 
 
Applying this analysis it is possible to specify a variable closely reflecting this feature of FURs: 
the ratio of the total population of the largest (relevant) unit of government representing the FUR 
to the population of the FUR as a whole. We are implicitly assuming this will be the 
governmental unit with the largest population, usually representing the central administrative 
unit of the FUR, but this is qualified by 'relevant': by which we mean that the governmental unit 
concerned must have significant powers of action. Even though it might be the largest N.U.T.S. 
region with a territory overlapping that of the London FUR, for example, the South East Region 
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would not have been a 'relevant' governmental unit because it had essentially no powers
5.  The 
rules by which such ‘relevant’ local government units were identified were established before 
any models including the variable were estimated so that the variable could be defined blind of 
the data. The rules used are set out in Appendix 1.  
 
We call this the policy capacity variable because it is designed to measure the capacity to 
prosecute policies promoting growth at the FUR level
6. In identifying the largest 'relevant' 
unit of government, 'relevant' is defined as a sub-national unit of government with an 
administrative area encompassing or corresponding to (some proportion of) the territory of a 
FUR and which has significant administrative and decision-making powers. Since the largest 
'relevant' unit was selected, it was also in all cases the highest tier of sub-national government 
relating to the territory of the FUR. Since one criterion was that the unit of government 
selected should have significant administrative and decision making powers the Level 1 
regions were potentially available for selection in European countries with a regional level of 
government. In practice, this means that the value of the variable can range from only about 
0.125 to over 2. We might further hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very high, 
so that the size of the ‘relevant’ unit of government considerably exceeded the size of the 
FUR, then the capacity to generate local growth promoting policies would begin to weaken. 
This is because the interests of the FUR would begin to be lost in those of the larger unit 
which might pursue policies favouring rural areas or smaller centres. If this were the case then 
we would expect to observe a quadratic functional form with a maximum positive impact 
where the value of the policy capacity variable was between 1 and 2.  
 
The concentration of the R & D facilities of large companies and of university students per 
employee (both measured for the start of the period analysed) are included to test for the 
influence on local growth of highly skilled human capital and specialisation in R & D. The 
theoretical reasons for focusing on these factors follow the analysis of Romer (1990) as adapted 
to a spatial context by, for example, Cheshire and Carbonaro (1996) and Magrini (1998). There 
is an extensive literature on the role of human capital in economic growth so the inclusion of 
these variables requires little justification.  
 
At least since the 1960s there have been arguments that (European) integration would have 
systematic spatial effects, economically favouring ‘core’ regions. An early empirical attempt 
to quantify such effects was embodied in the work of Clark et al., (1969). More recently 
theoretical work by Krugman and Venables has produced formal models with essentially the 
same conclusions (see Fujita et al., 1999, for an up to date survey). The Integration Gain 
variable, selected to measure the direct spatial impacts of European integration, is calculated 
from the work of Clark et al., (1969) supplemented with the estimates for the regions of Spain 
and Portugal provided by Keeble et al., (1988) and scaled to Clark et al’s values. Values for 
Athens, Lisboa, Porto and Saliniki were interpolated to provide coverage of all the regions of 
the EU of 12. Since our interest is in growth we have calculated the change in the values of 
'economic potential'
7 from the pre-Treaty of Rome values to those estimated as being 
associated with an elimination of tariffs, the EU’s enlargement of the 1980s and a reduction in 
transport costs following the introduction of roll-on roll-off ferries and containerisation.  
                                                 
5 During the period analysed there was a South East Regional Planning Council (SERPLAN) but this was 
effectively no more than a forum for discussion. 
6 Implicitly we assume FURs – since they are defined to be economically self-contained and therefore minimise 
spillover losses of growth to politically defined territories outside their boundaries – approximate to the ‘most 
appropriate territorial units’ at which to pursue local growth promotion policies. 
7 Economic potential is a measure of the accessibility at any point to total GDP allowing for costs of distance 
including tariffs. For further discussion see Clark et al., 1969  
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The theoretical arguments as to why integration should favour core regions do not imply that the 
relationship measured for the 1980s or the 1990s should necessarily be linear with respect to the 
variable used here.  Clark's calculations are for different hypothetical states of the world but with 
regional GDP data estimated for, and fixed at, 1966.  Any differential spatial growth induced by 
integration might have been fastest where economic potential increased most in the initial stages.  
But such growth would tend to bid up local factor costs and produce additional congestion, other 
things equal.  In turn, with a fixed and single integration shock, this would tend to produce 
deconcentration over time from the core to surrounding regions. Therefore, in the absence of 
further integration shocks, by the 1980s the relationship between differential urban growth and 
Clark et al's (1969) estimates of the change in economic potential might be expected to be 
quadratic. The greatest gains would no longer have been in the core regions but in the outer 
core/near periphery.  The introduction of the Single European Market (SEM) and then of 
monetary union might be expected to have provided new integration shocks, however, and so 
have given additional impetus to the spatial impact of European integration. Thus with the 
extension of the observations into the 1990s and so including data for the period leading up to 
and immediately following the SEM, there might be a reinforcing of the influence of the change 
in economic potential on FUR growth. Such an increase in the influence of European integration 
on local growth would be reflected in an increased significance of the estimated co-efficient of 
the Integration Gain variable and a reversion to a linear functional form. This would reflect a re-
concentration of the strongest impact in the inner core regions. This is exactly the result reported 
in Tables 1a and 1b where the variable is significant and the functional form linear (compared to 
the results reported in Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996, using data only to 1990, in which the 
functional form was quadratic and the variable only weakly significant). 
 
3. Results of modelling urban growth rates 
The results of three basic models, which do not include explicit spatial factors beyond the 
Integration Gain variable, are reported in Table 1a. It will be seen that all variables are significant 
and have the expected sign
8. As in previous work, the functional form relating to the initial size 
of the port industry is quadratic implying that the transformation of the port industry since about 
1970 may have at least relatively favoured the very largest ports. The three sets of variables 
which are the focus of our attention here are all significant. Also, as expected, there is a quadratic 
functional form between the observed rate of growth of a city and its policy capacity. 
 
Thus, these results appear acceptable. The adjusted R
2, with 121 observations in a cross sectional 
analysis, is 0.65 and all variables are significant with the expected signs; nor are there are any 
problems of non-normality of errors or heteroskedasticity. The results, moreover, are consistent 
with economic theory and suggest interesting new insights as to the potential role of both human 
capital and growth promotion policies in accounting for growth differences between EU city 
regions.  
 
However, inspection of Table 1b, which reports the key results of diagnostic tests, suggests 
there may be problems: there are signs of spatial dependence. As is well known a key problem 
in testing for spatial dependence compared to serial autocorrelation is the specification of the 
‘proximity’ of one observation to another. There is no obvious basis upon which distance 
weights can be determined. Tests were conducted using 28 different distance weight matrices. 
We report only the results for which the greatest sensitivity was found. Measuring distance as 
the inverse of time distance using the standard road freight software to estimate the time 
distance between FURs always provided the measure most sensitive to spatial dependency. In 
                                                 
8 Models were estimated in Stata using robust standard errors. 
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Tables 1b and 3b, we report results for two formulations - the inverse of time distance and the 
inverse of time distance squared.  
Tables 1a & 1b about here 
 
An innovation in the present paper, however, is that we have also included an additional ‘time 
distance penalty’ if FURs are separated by a national border. This partly reflects recent work 
reported in Cheshire and Magrini (2004) which found that there was adjustment within 
countries but not between them to differences in quality of life. The implication is that 
national borders in Europe still represent substantial barriers to spatial adjustment. Border 
time-distance costs from 0 to 300 minutes were experimented with and the results were most 
sensitive if it was implicitly assumed a national border represented a time-distance of 300 
minutes. 
 
If we look at the results for Model 3, the diagnostics for spatial dependence most obviously 
suggest the presence of spatial lag dependence using the inverse of time distance squared plus 
a border penalty of 300 minutes
9. This is of interest in itself since it underlines how important 
the choice of the distance weights is. In many previous tests on similar models in which no 
time-distance penalty was imposed for national borders, no problems of spatial dependence 
were evident. If the standard remedy is applied and a maximum likelihood model is estimated 
with spatial lags, using the same independent variables, the model appears to work in much 
the same way although two estimated parameters – for policy capacity squared and integration 
gain – are now only significant at the 10% level. The results are reported in Table 2 which 
also reports results from further diagnostics for the spatially lagged model. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Although indications of spatial dependence are less obvious, a significant new problem 
emerges. The ordering of the values of the Wald, LR and LMLAG statistics is unsatisfactory 
suggesting specification problems. Although the LR, Wald and LM tests are all 
asymptotically equivalent, they tend to yield different results in finite samples. In particular, 
the ordering of statistics in terms of their magnitude should be: 
 
W ≥ LR ≥ LM 
 
This suggested the need to try to represent the spatial interactions more directly within the model 
itself. Table 3a reports some results from such experiments with Table 3b reporting the 
corresponding diagnostic test results. These models include three additional variables. The first is 
a spatial version of the university student variable. The rationale for this is that previous analysis 
(see, for example, Cheshire and Magrini, 2000) found that a concentration of university students 
within a local economy had a positive effect on its growth. Workers embodying greater human 
capital commute longer distances and so a proportion of those living in FURs close to other, 
more dynamic ones, may commute to work in the more prosperous region. In addition, Costa and 
Kahn (2000) found an increasing concentration over time of more couples embodying more 
human capital where opportunities were greatest (and bearing in mind that our university 
students measure relates to the start of the period so does not reflect any tendency for such 
workers to concentrate where opportunities are greatest).  
                                                 
9 Other values for the border penalty are available from the authors but for Model 3 the test statistics revealed no 
problems of spatial dependence if the border penalty was assumed to be less than 40 minutes and signs of spatial 
dependence became stronger as the penalty was ‘increased’ to 300 minutes. Results were always more sensitive 
if the inverse of time distance squared was used rather than the inverse of time distance.  
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These factors suggest we might expect faster growing FURs to attract human capital from 
surrounding ones increasing their growth further. So we constructed a variable, for each FUR, 
measuring the distance discounted concentration of university students in all other FURs 
within 150 minutes travel time (other cutoffs were tried but 150 minutes worked best) of the 
FUR in question. The prior is that, other things being equal, the stronger the concentration of 
university students in surrounding FURs, the slower should be growth in the observed FUR. 
A negative coefficient would also be consistent with the idea that human capital has a 
tendency to concentrate over space. 
Tables 3a & 3b about here 
Model 4 in Table 3a includes this variable plus a dummy for the FURs of North East Italy, 
previous work having suggested that while there might not be ‘two Italies’ it was difficult to 
account for the growth performance of three Italian cities – Padua, Venezia  and Verona on 
the basis of their characteristics alone. The variable measuring the distance-discounted 
concentration of university students in surrounding FURs is significant and has a negative 
sign. More generally, this specification appears to improve the econometric problems 
associated with Model 3. Measures of fit increase substantially and the model passes 
normality and heteroskedasticity tests at usual confidence levels. Perhaps more interesting are 
the results of the tests on spatial dependence; while there was a problem of spatial lag 
dependence in Models 1, 2 and 3, there is now only spatial error dependence, a substantially 
less serious problem.  
 
These encouraging results prompted further experimentation with devising explicitly spatial 
variables. The next variable, included in Model 5, is a measure of the spatial concentration of 
unemployment at the start of the period in the FURs surrounding the observed FUR. Because 
of the concentration of unemployment on less skilled workers who have smaller labour 
market search areas and shorter commutes, we should expect a stronger distance decay effect 
and a cutoff of 60 minutes commuting time gives the best results. As would be expected the 
parameter estimate for the variable measuring the concentration of unemployment in a FUR 
compared to its neighbours has a negative sign: the higher the initial level of unemployment 
in a FUR compared to its neighbours, the slower the FUR’s growth over the subsequent 
period. Other co-efficient estimates remain significant and are numerically little changed.   
 
As in Model 4, however, there are signs of spatial error dependence so we have estimated a 
corresponding spatial error model using maximum likelihood. This is reported in Table 4. In 
this all variables are highly significant (at 3% or better), with no signs of misspecification 
and, in particular, the ordering of the Wald, LR and LMERR tests is as expected, indicating no 
apparent specification problems. 
Table 4 about here 
The final variable is added in model 6. This is a measure of the differential growth in the 
observed FUR compared to all its neighbouring FURs over the first six years of the period. 
The sum of the differential growth rates in surrounding FURs is discounted by distance and 
summed to a 150 minute time-distance. In principle, therefore, there is little chance of 
endogeneity: although the growth rate of the observed FUR is in a sense on both sides of the 
estimated model, on the right hand side it is over the first six years only and it is the sum of 
the differences in the growth rates discounted to a maximum of 150 minutes travelling time. 
Thus, for some 10 percent of FURs the value of the sum of the differential growth variable is 
zero and the correlation coefficient between this variable and the dependent one is only 0.43.  
 
This growth differentials variable represents a ‘growth shadow’ effect: the expectation is that 
if a FUR is growing faster than its neighbours in the early part of the period it will grow even 
faster over the period as a whole than it otherwise would. This will be for any or all of three 
10 European Urban Growth: throwing some economic light into the black box 
reasons. The first is that its commuting area will be expanding, as opportunities within it will 
have improved relative to surrounding cities, attracting more workers. Since output is counted 
at workplaces but people at their homes, measures of GDP p.c. are liable, therefore, to 
become upwardly biased and the measured growth rate correspondingly inflated. As we have 
shown in Cheshire and Magrini (1998) however this does not account for all of the effect of 
the growth differential variable since its statistical impact remains even when the model is re-
estimated on growth in GDP per employee rather than GDP per capita. A second possible 
reason to expect a significant relationship is that workers attracted to commute to the faster 
growing FUR will travel longer distances and longer distance commuters are likely to 
embody more human capital on average so there may be a favourable composition effect on 
the workforce of the FUR growing faster at the start of the period and a corresponding 
negative composition effect on the labour force of FURs which were slower growing. The 
final possible reason for expecting a ‘growth shadow’ effect is that there may be dynamic 
agglomeration economies. The initially faster growing FUR gains productivity and jobs and 
this in turn helps raise productivity and jobs along the lines investigated by Ciccone and Hall 
(1996). 
 
Including the sum of growth differentials variable makes the spatial unemployment variable 
non-significant, so that is dropped from Model 6. Using robust standard errors, all other 
variables are significant and have the expected sign. Looking at the regression diagnostics, 
there are now no signs of significant spatial dependence in terms of either lags or errors 
although there are signs from the Jarque-Bera test that the errors are not normal (see Table 
3b). This should not, however, be too serious a problem leading to biased estimates and other 
tests, such as the Shapiro-Wilk, indicate no problem of non-normality in any case. 
 
Our conclusion is, therefore, that by including variables reflecting theoretically relevant spatial 
adjustment mechanisms and features of the world it is possible effectively to eliminate apparent 
problems of spatial dependency. Spatial dependency largely reflects model specification and if 
explicit spatial factors are included, such problems are resolved. Furthermore testing for spatial 
dependency is itself very demanding. No problems had been indicated in earlier work and it was 
only when the lessons of Cheshire and Magrini (2004) were applied and a substantial time 
penalty for national borders was introduced into the distance weights matrix that problems of 
spatial dependency appeared anyway. 
 
From an economic perspective the main conclusions are to re-enforce previous findings that 
local differences in human capital and R & D activity are important factors in explaining 
differential rates of urban economic growth and that European integration has had a significant 
impact in accelerating growth in core regions of Europe. In economic terms, there is evidence 
that the gains of integration have been unevenly distributed spatially. Finally, there is new 
evidence strongly supporting the conclusion that administrative and government arrangements 
for cities systematically influence their growth. Where there is a governmental unit 
approximating to the economic boundaries of an economically self-contained city-region, growth 
is stronger. This is consistent with the expectations relating to the promotion of growth as a local 
public good and the resulting advantage if spillover losses and transactions costs are minimised. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper tests a series of propositions relating to the European spatial economy and 
particularly to the mechanisms of adjustment within it (implicitly contrasted with those in the 
US). We investigate, in particular, the effects on urban growth performance of European 
integration, human capital endowments and concentration on R & D and the impact variation 
in the arrangements for urban government may have. Policies that encourage local economic 
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growth can be seen as the provision of a local public good. Conditions increasingly favour the 
development of growth promoting clubs, therefore, as spillover losses and transactions costs 
fall. The policy capacity variable, measured as the ratio of the size of the largest governmental 
unit to that of the economic region (FUR) is designed to reflect this capacity to develop local 
growth promotion clubs and produces statistically powerful results. 
 
Policies encouraging local economic growth are not here conceived of as being particularly 
concerned with inward investment nor even, necessarily, with explicitly promoting growth at 
all. They may consist mainly of efficient local public administration, the avoidance of waste 
and a focus on activities that government at an urban level can effectively influence, such as 
the supply of skills or infrastructure planning, rather than redistribution. It is not possible to 
measure these factors comparably across the urban areas of the EU as a whole. Indeed, it is 
difficult to think of any general direct quantitative indicator. Work in the US, for example 
Rappaport 1999, has used measures of individual policies, such as expenditures on elementary 
and secondary school education. The variable used in the present paper seems justified on 
theoretical grounds but is an indirect measure designed to reflect not the policies themselves 
but the capacity of an urban government to generate such policies. There is a strong positive 
association between this variable and economic growth performance. This is apparent even in 
a very simple model but more fully specified models and further testing confirm its statistical 
significance and provide evidence of a quadratic functional form. This suggests that if the 
government unit is too large relative to the FUR concerned the interests of the FUR may tend 
to get lost in those of the larger region. 
 
The results also support the conclusion of Cheshire and Magrini (2004). A compensating 
variations model across the whole territory of the EU of 12 is not appropriate because while 
adjustments do occur they occur strictly within nations not across the EU as a whole. Here we 
find that indications of spatial dependence in the results are only observed if a substantial 
time-distance penalty is added where FURs are separated by national boundaries. Results are 
most sensitive if national boundaries are represented by a penalty equivalent to 300 minutes 
travel time.  
 
One conclusion from this pair of findings is that in a European context of restricted labour 
mobility, income growth rather than population growth is a more appropriate indicator of 
improvements in welfare in a city. Furthermore we find that the resulting econometric 
problems are best resolved if explicit spatial economic effects are included in the model rather 
than simply resorting to technical fixes such as estimating models with a spatial lag. These 
spatial effects include one derived from the assumption that commuting flows (in contrast to 
migration) play a significant role in Europe in spatial adjustment between neighbouring 
FURs. We observe a significant 'growth shadow' effect with cities in contiguously urbanised 
regions (such as most of the Benelux countries or large areas of Germany, northern Italy or 
England) growing faster the closer they are to other less rapidly growing cities. This seems to 
reflect adjustment in commuting patterns to take advantage of changing patterns of spatial 
economic opportunity.  
 
The empirical results also provide support for the theoretical work of Magrini (1997; 1998) on 
the role of human capital in regional growth and its interaction with the effects of integration. In 
this, a plausible outcome of the process of European integration is that regional economic growth 
diverges and the disparities in per capita income increase rather than converge. Integration 
similar to that which has characterised recent European history is seen as a possible cause for the 
emergence of a new steady-state equilibrium characterised by a further concentration of research 
activities in the regions which were already relatively specialised in research. While the 
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adjustment takes place through the spatial reallocation of unskilled labour and human capital, the 
average per capita income in the more innovative, relatively research-intensive region(s) grows 
at a faster rate than in the other region(s). At the same time 'unskilled' labour (and population) 
increases in the non-research specialised regions. This leads to a new steady-state distribution of 
per capita income characterised by an increase in spatial disparities. 
 
The results do not identify a policy lever one could pull to change the outcomes observed. It does 
not follow, for example, that if every city were given the same proportion of university students 
per employee they would all have grown at the same rate as the actually best endowed with 
universities did. While true that the differences in endowment with universities was one factor in 
explaining growth differences - and that helps understand what was going on - there is no 
necessary symmetry about the impact of giving all cities the same sized relative university 
sectors. It is probable that the unobserved characteristics of the cities with the highest ratios of 
university students were, and still are, different in important ways from cities with the lowest 
ratios; and were not independent of the concentration of universities in them. Nor is it possible to 
think in practical terms of providing all cities with equally high ratios of university students per 
total employee and maintaining a constant quality of university students (and students who then 
disproportionately join the local labour force).  
 
It is much more plausible to think of the findings on the policy capacity variable as 
identifying a ‘policy lever’. Local and regional government boundaries and functions could be 
restructured and, if an important element of the disadvantage FURs with fragmented local 
government structures face results from the problems of spillovers and transaction costs 
entailed in forming effective growth clubs, the outcome should be more effective growth 
policies all round. A problem is that, of course, ‘effective’ local growth promotion policies at 
present, in circumstances in which not all city regions are equally well endowed with the 
capacity to develop them, may be significantly competitive and diversionary. Some local 
growth may be zero sum. The success of the successful may significantly be a function of the 
poor performance of the unsuccessful. It does not follow that all policies designed to promote 
local growth are zero sum, however. It is reasonable to expect that there could be net 
efficiency gains for the EU's urban system as a whole if government boundaries – at least for 
the highest strategic tiers of local government – were aligned more closely with those 
reflecting economically relevant patterns of behaviour and spatial economic organisation. 
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Table 1a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
mean 1992/4: Basic Models: robust standard errors 
Model 1  2  3 
R2 0.5903  0.6296  0.6896 
R2-adj 0.5570  0.5922  0.6486 
LIK 485.560  491.662  502.356 
Constant -0.0204808  -0.023909  -0.0363739 
t -2.35  -2.95  -4.42 
prob 0.02  0.00  0.00 
Coalfield: core  -0.0053883  -0.0057917  -0.005883 
t -5.08  -5.21  -5.74 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.0057241  -0.0049746  -0.0045517 
t -3.64  -2.94  -2.34 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.02 
Port size ’69  -0.0013639  -0.0014127  -0.0014162 
t -3.18  -3.23  -3.39 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Port size ’69
2 0.0000617  0.0000662  0.0000696 
t 2.88  3.06  3.27 
prob 0.01  0.00  0.00 
Agric Emp.’75  0.0004087  0.000425  0.0005766 
t 2.59  2.85  4.01 
prob 0.01  0.01  0.00 
Agric Emp.’75
2 -0.0000113  -0.0000114  -0.000013 
t -2.54  -2.79  -3.87 
prob 0.01  0.01  0.00 
Nat Ex-FUR GDP Grow ’79-’93  0.8600302  0.8586037  0.9644929 
t 9.84  9.88  9.53 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ln Population 1981  0.002082  0.0020731  0.0020723 
t 3.73  4.32  4.57 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Population Density 1981  -0.0000015  -0.0000014  -0.0000016 
t -3.41  -3.34  -3.22 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Policy Capacity    0.0094361 0.010123 
t    3.15 2.88 
prob    0.00 0.01 
Policy Capacity
2    -0.0031355 -0.0030385 
t    -2.42 -2.09 
prob    0.02 0.04 
University Students ratio 1977/78/79     0.0000292 
t     2.10 
prob     0.04 
R&D Facilities per million     0.0009666 
t     4.40 
prob     0.00 
Integration Gain     0.0028733 
t     2.07 
prob     0.04 
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Table 1b: Regression diagnostics for : Basic Models  
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (SpaceStat)  Models  1      2      3   
MULTICOLLINEARITY  CONDITION  NUMBER  67.27            74.09   85.33  
TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS                   
TEST DF  PROB VALUE              DF  PROB VALUE DF VALUE PROB
Jarque-Bera        2  1.627573 0.44  2  4.328227 0.11  2  3.703177 0.16 
DIAGNOSTICS  FOR  HETEROSKEDASTICITY                  
RANDOM  COEFFICIENTS             
TEST                DF  PROB VALUE DF  PROB VALUE DF VALUE PROB
Breusch-Pagan test  9  5.9155  0.75  11  9.0012  0.62  14  19.4136  0.15 
Koenker-Bassett test                     
DIAGNOSTICS  FOR  SPATIAL  DEPENDENCE             
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with 300 minute national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF        VALUE PROB          MI/DF VALUE PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB
Moran's I (error)  0.041414  3.559738  0.00  0.050933        4.20115 0.00  0.01725 2.456196 0.01 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  3.591981  0.06  1 5.433091  0.02  1 0.623166  0.43 
Robust  LM  (error)  1                  0.557836 0.46 1 2.578361 0.11 1 0.728593 0.39
Kelejian-Robinson  (error)                    10 1.700541 1.00 12 2.255538 1.00 15 3.917696 1.00
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  3.706845  0.05  1    2.864066  0.09  1 3.762118  0.05 
Robust LM (lag)  1  0.672701  0.41  1  0.009337  0.92  1  3.867544  0.05 
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)  2  4.264681  0.12  2  5.442427  0.07  2    4.490711  0.11
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX  Inverse of time-distance squared with 300 minute national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF      VALUE            PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB
Moran's I (error)  0.095431  2.319449  0.02  0.117959        2.783896 0.01  0.032549 1.277086 0.20 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  3.016293  0.08  1 4.60844  0.03  1 0.350882  0.55 
Robust  LM  (error)  1                0.23616  0.63 1 0.169885 0.68 1 2.367267 0.12
Kelejian-Robinson  (error)                    10 1.700541 1.00 12 2.255538 1.00 15 3.917696 1.00
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  6.704261  0.01  1    5.948594  0.01  1 4.813978  0.03 
Robust LM (lag)  1  3.924129  0.05  1      1.510038  0.22 1 6.830363  0.01 
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)  2  6.940421  0.03  2    6.118478  0.05  2 7.181245  0.03 
*Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level 
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Table 2:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Best Basic Model 3 with Spatial Lag: Maximum Likelihood estimate 
 
  Model 3  REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
Log Lik  504.504   
Constant  -0.03957020   
z  -4.47 
prob  0.00 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity Random 
Coefficients Test 
Spatial lag of Dep. Variable  0.21321500    DF Value  Prob. 
z  2.07 Breusch-Pagan  test  14  18.4627  0.19 
prob  0.04  Spatial B-P test  14  18.4628  0.19 
Coalfield: core  -0.00556043        
z  -4.99        
prob  0.00 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.00427724 
z  -2.93 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence:: 
weights matrix = inverse of time distance 
squared + 300 minute border penalty 
prob  0.00    DF Value  Prob. 
Port size ’69  -0.00144035  Likelihood Ratio test  1  4.2962  0.04 
z  -3.99        
prob  0.00  Lagrange Multiplier Test  1 2.6522  0.10 
Port size ’69
2  0.00007244        
z  3.18        
prob  0.00   
Agric Emp.’75  0.00043412 WALD  test  18.4575 
z  2.87 LR  test  4.2962 
prob  0.00  LM (lag) test  4.8140 
Agric Emp.’75
2  -0.00000995 ORDERING:  W  ≥ LR ≥ LM  NO 
z  -2.58 
prob  0.01 
Nat Ex-FUR GDP Grow ’79-’93  0.86257600 
z  8.12 
prob  0.00 
Ln Population 1981  0.00194793 
z  3.59 
prob  0.00 
Population Density 1981  -0.00000165 
z  -2.72 
prob  0.01 
Policy Capacity  0.00895096 
z  2.75 
prob  0.01 
Policy Capacity
2  -0.00261072 
z  -1.76 
prob  0.08 
University Students ratio 
1977/78/79  0.00003085 
z  2.93 
prob  0.00 
R&D Facilities per million  0.00089284 
z  3.35 
prob  0.00 
Integration Gain  0.00230783 
 
z  1.81   
prob  0.07   
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Table 3a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
mean 1992/4: Models with Spatial Effects: robust standard errors 
Model 4  5  6 
R2 0.7373  0.7485  0.8017 
R2-adj 0.6969  0.7069  0.7690 
LIK 512.457  515.0790  529.4770 
     
Models 4, 5 & 6 include a constant and the control variables included in Models 1, 2 & 3 
Policy Capacity  0.0096869  0.0107756  0.0099736 
t 3.06  3.35  3.54 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Policy Capacity
2 -0.0029130  -0.0033664  -0.003310 
t -2.20  -2.51  -2.95 
prob 0.03  0.01  0.00 
Integration Gain  0.0036095  0.0037506  0.002826 
t 2.58  2.71  2.27 
prob 0.01  0.01  0.03 
University Students ratio 1977/78/79  0.0000281  0.0000255  0.000027 
t 2.69  2.41  2.78 
prob 0.01  0.02  0.01 
R&D Facilities per million  0.0008321 0.0008687 0.000640 
t 4.38  4.51  3.56 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
University Student density in neighbouring FURs 
within 150 minutes  -0.0002478  -0.0002574  -0.000184 
t -2.26  -2.51  -2.13 
prob 0.03  0.01  0.04 
Dummy for FURs in N.E.Italy  0.0090491  0.0091916  0.0076496 
t 4.67  4.82  4.71 
prob 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Density of Unemployment in FURs within 60 
minutes   -0.0056571   
t   -2.20   
prob   0.03   
Differential GDP growth 1980-86 in FURs within 
150 minutes + 300 minute border effect      0.2176448 
t     6.40 
prob     0.00 
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Table 3b: Regression diagnostics for Models with Spatial Effects 
 
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (SpaceStat)  Model  4      5      6   
MULTICOLLINEARITY CONDITION NUMBER  88.73      88.80      89.29    
TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS                  
TEST DF  PROB VALUE          DF  PROB VALUE  DF VALUE  PROB
Jarque-Bera        2  0.26 2.667858   2.039287 2  0.36  10.821618 2  0.00 
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY                  
RANDOM  COEFFICIENTS                
TEST                DF  PROB VALUE DF  PROB VALUE DF VALUE PROB
Breusch-Pagan test  16  23.07811  0.11  17  21.7728  0.19       
Koenker-Bassett test                 17  24.250418  0.11
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE                  
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX (row-standardized)  Inverse of time-distance with 300 minute national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF      VALUE            PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB
Moran's I (error)  -0.038954  -1.125909  0.26  -0.04088      -1.309675 0.19  -0.025991 -0.213808 0.83 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  3.177893  0.07  1 3.499981      0.06  1 1.414823 0.23
Robust LM (error)  1  4.861535  0.03  1          5.63534 0.02  1 2.601492 0.11
Kelejian-Robinson  (error)                    17 4.131198 1.00 18 4.321249 1.00 18 3.539844 1.00
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  0.046442  0.83  1  0.018927  0.89  1  0.020794  0.89 
Robust  LM  (lag)  1                  1.730085 0.19 1 2.154286 0.14 1 1.207463 0.27
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)  2  4.907977  0.09  2          5.654267 0.06  2 2.622286 0.27
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX  Inverse of time-distance squared with 300 minute national border effect 
TEST  MI/DF      VALUE            PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB MI/DF VALUE PROB
Moran's I (error)  -0.096353  -1.105745  0.27  -0.103981      -1.286353 0.20  -0.068779 -0.556454 0.58 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)  1  3.074883  0.08  1 3.580986      0.06  1 1.566769 0.21
Robust LM (error)  1  6.629331  0.01  1          7.707307 0.01  1 3.596428 0.06
Kelejian-Robinson  (error)                    17 4.131198 1.00 18 4.321249 1.00 18 3.539844 1.00
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  0.01904  0.89  1  0.035026  0.85  1  0.115314  0.73 
Robust LM (lag)  1  3.573489  0.06  1          4.161348 0.04  1 2.144973 0.14
Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)                  
*Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level
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Table 4:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Model 5 with Spatial Error correction: Maximum Likelihood estimate 
  Model 5e REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
Log Lik  519.695   
Constant plus:     
lambda  -0.601453 
z  -3.79 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity Random 
Coefficients Test 
prob  0.00    DF Value  Prob. 
Control variables as per model 3   Breusch-Pagan  test  17  19.2302  0.32 
Plus:    Spatial B-P test  17  19.2317  0.32 
          
Nat Ex-FUR GDP Grow ’79-’93  0.9732780        
z  12.85 
prob  0.00 
Ln Population 1981  0.0021748 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence:: 
weights matrix = inverse of time distance 
squared + 300 minute border penalty 
z  4.34    DF Value  Prob. 
prob  0.00  Likelihood Ratio test  1  9.231219  0.00 
Population Density 1981  -0.0000013       
z  -2.28  Lagrange Multiplier Test  1 1.6096  0.20 
prob  0.02        
Policy Capacity  0.0123599        
z  4.27   
prob  0.00 WALD  test  14.3327 
Policy Capacity
2  -0.0042157 LR test  9.2312 
z  -3.19  LM (lag) test  5.6896 
prob  0.00 ORDERING:  W  ≥ LR ≥ LM  YES 
University Students ratio 1977/78/79  0.0000221 
z  2.38 
prob  0.02 
R&D Facilities per million  0.0010454 
z  4.94 
prob  0.00 
Integration Gain  0.0043989 
z  4.41 
prob  0.00 
University Student density in 
neighbouring FURs within 150 minutes  -0.0002801
z  -3.64 
prob  0.00 
Dummy for FURs in N.E.Italy  0.00977223
z  6.53 
prob  0.00 
Density of Unemployment in FURs 
within 60 minutes  -0.00661023
z  -2.61 
prob  0.01 
Differential GDP growth 1980 -86 in 
FURs within 150 minutes + 300 minute 
border effect   
z   
prob   
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and data 
Table A1: The dependent variable was in all cases the annualised rate of FUR growth in GDP p.c. 
converted at OECD PPS. Growth measured either between means of 1978/80 and 1992/94. 
 
Variable Name  Description 
Ln Population  Natural log of population in 1979 
Population density  Density of population in FUR in 1979 
Industrial Emp.’75  Percentage of labour force in industry in surrounding level 2 region in 
1975: source Eurostat 
Coalfield: core   A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
Coalfield: hinterland  A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
Port size ’69  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
Agric Emp.’75  Percentage of labour force in agriculture in surrounding Level 2 region 
in 1975 
Nat Ex-FUR GDP Grow ’80-’00  Annualised rate of growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each country 
outside major FURs between 1979 and 1993 
Policy Capacity  Ratio of FUR population to the population of the largest governmental 
unit associated with the FUR (1981): see below for details. 
Integration Gain 
Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from movement from 
individual nation-states to post enlargement EU with reduced transport 
costs (estimated from Clark et al 1969 and Keeble et al 1988) 
University Students ratio 1977/78/79  Ratio between university and higher education students (1977-1978) 
and total employment (1979) 
R&D Facilities per million population R&D laboratories of Fortune top companies per million population 
(1980) 
University Student density in 
neighbouring FURs within 150 
minutes 
Sum of university and higher education students per 1000 employees 
in neighbouring FURs (150 minutes) 
Dummy for FURs in N.E.Italy  Dummy for Padua, Venezia and Verona 
Density of Unemployment in FURs 
within 60 minutes 
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average between 
1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in neighbouring FURs (60min) 
weighted by the distance 
Differential GDP growth 1980-86 in 
FURs within 150 minutes + 300 
minute border effect 
Sum of difference in growth of per capita GDP (1980-1986; 3-year 
averages) between the FUR and those within 150 min weighted by 
distance (border effect = 300min 
 
To estimate the Policy Capacity variable the rules determining the selection of the largest 
'relevant' governmental unit were: 
Belgium  The central communes for all except Bruxelles for which the capital 
region (Arrondissement) was taken; 
Denmark Central  Municipality; 
Germany  The Kreisfreie Stadte except for Bremen and Hamburg where the Land 
(a NUTS 1 region) was taken and Frankfurt where the Umlandverband 
was taken; 
France  Since there is a NUTS 1 region, the Ile de France, which has significant 
powers, was selected for Paris. Elsewhere in France the central 
Commune was selected except for those FURs for which a Communité 
Urbaine exists; in those cases the Communité Urbaine was selected 
Greece The  central  Municipality; 
Ireland  The County Borough (of Dublin); 
Italy  The central Commune was selected in all cases. Unlike the situation in 
France (Paris) or Germany (Bremen and Hamburg) there is no NUTS 1 
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or 2 region corresponding to any city nor is there any city with a city 
wide tier of government (such as the Communité Urbaine). 
The Netherlands  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Portugal  The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Spain  Where there was one major FUR in a Communidad Autonoma (a 
NUTS 2 region), the Communidad Autonoma was selected; where there 
was more than one major FUR in the Communidad Autonoma but only 
one in the Provincia (a NUTS 3 region), the Provincia was selected; 
where there was more than one major FUR within a Provincia then the 
central Municipio was selected; 
United Kingdom  In England, the District was selected except in London where Inner 
London was used; in Scotland, the regions of Lothian and Strathclyde 
were taken and for Belfast the NUTS 1 region of Northern Ireland was 
the government unit identified. 
 
The only case, then, for which no obvious rule was available, was that of London because of the 
radical change to the system of government in the middle of the period. The Greater London 
Council was abolished in 1985 and local government powers were re-assigned down to the 32 
boroughs and up to committees of boroughs and to central government. There were further 
changes to this system in the later part of the period when the Government Office for London 
was set up.  The only stable unit of government relating to London was the City of London or the 
individual London boroughs but there was a regional authority – Greater London – for half the 
period. The selection of Inner London - not really a governmental unit at all - represented no 
more than the most reasonable compromise. We tested alternatives and as might be expected, 
substituting the value for the largest borough or the GLC as a whole made no material difference 
to the results reported here. 
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